This is the first movie I have seeen in a while that I can confidently call "great". Many movies are Art; some few are even Literature. But the element that elevates something from being masterfully done and perfectly executed, to the level of greatness is its overwhelming necessity. A film cannot be great without having a reason to exist.
Which is not to say that I personally must agree with that reason. In the case under consideration here, I decidedly do not. Evangelism and religious apologia of all sorts are rather nauseating to me, and I experienced just that nausea at certain baldly didactic moments while watching this film. But the niche that this film occupies, its necessity in the biome of human ideas, is undeniable.
But that necessity only allows the film's greatness; it does not predicate it. To reach that potential, it also had to succeed on every technical level, from orchestration to set design. And even if this film had no reason to exist, it would still be Art. The art of cinematography is on full display in every facet of this film. How to describe the spectacle of the chariot race? The naval battle? That it was all achieved without modern technology only makes it more marvelous, but is not a condition of admiration. Those sequences could stand beside similar ones in contemporary movies without handicap.
And perhaps the greatest miracle of all is how gracefully the writing trod the line between entertainment and propaganda. The metaphysical themes of the setting never once departed from the very real, human, and believable personal drama that gives them their power. I can find no complaint even with the central romance, which never felt contrived for appeal, though it surely was. I place this movie confidently near the top of the list of movie I call great, though I must in good conscience demote it slightly because it advertises what I consider to be a lie.
Monday, February 25, 2019
Jean-Paul Sartre: Being and Nothingness
It is perhaps indicitave of my predilection for systemic ontology that I see art in literature, and vice-versa. How many ideas really exist, after all? Two opposing forces? The eight trigrams that come from those forces? The 64 relationships between those eight? At any rate, there is a limit. And it is no more strange to say that the fundamental idea 艮 captures the nature of both the mountain and the stomach, than to say that Bach is fundamentally the same as Escher, or, as I have done in this blog, to say that Gibbon is fundamentally a Persian rug, Müller is a torn photographic collage, and Le Clézio an Impressionist painting.
So perhaps I can be forgiven for taking a similar approach to Sartre. No doubt he would approve; his extended efforts to isolate the exact nature of visqueux are of essentially the same nature, after all. What is this book? It is philosophy, of course, but that definition is no more helpful than to say that something visqueux is slimy. Sartre's philosophy is of a very different form from that of Kierkegaard's or Russell's. Although he seems to be trying to prove something, it cannot be said that he succeeds. His "proofs" rely so heavily on definitions that he himself has tendered, that what is contained in this book is not True, but rather a crystallization of what Sartre sees to be true. It is often opaque, reductive, and inextricably tangled. It would be easy to see it as merely a heap of recurving wires that go nowhere and prove nothing.
But to dismiss Sartre's work as such would be akin to trying to read it upside-down. From that perspective, the words have no shape, let alone a greater meaning. The key to understanding words is to look at them from the right perspective, and this is especially true of Sartre. What is contained in Being and Nothingness is not fine, sound, indisputable ideas; it is rather a perspective, a way of looking at existence. It reveals marvelous vistas, and opens up entire hallways filled with doors to insight on the nature of being--but only if you look at it right. This book is not its words; it is the point-of-view that allowed the words to be written. The words themselves are as anamorphic as that modern trend in art exemplified by Bernard Pras, or Tim Noble and Sue Webster. They are heaps of seemingly unrelated things that spring to life if one stands in the right spot or shines the right light.
Which means that, just as in the works of Noble and Webster, there are three requisite elements for the installation of this art: the seething mass of wires, the point at which one must stand to see them properly, and the shadow that they create. Sartre's version of reality is just as concerned with what is not, with nothingness, as with what exists. He wants us to see the shadow that existence casts even more than he wants us to see existence itself. And that shadow is the truth revealed when the light of Sartre's vision is cast through existence onto the wall of our own experience.
So perhaps I can be forgiven for taking a similar approach to Sartre. No doubt he would approve; his extended efforts to isolate the exact nature of visqueux are of essentially the same nature, after all. What is this book? It is philosophy, of course, but that definition is no more helpful than to say that something visqueux is slimy. Sartre's philosophy is of a very different form from that of Kierkegaard's or Russell's. Although he seems to be trying to prove something, it cannot be said that he succeeds. His "proofs" rely so heavily on definitions that he himself has tendered, that what is contained in this book is not True, but rather a crystallization of what Sartre sees to be true. It is often opaque, reductive, and inextricably tangled. It would be easy to see it as merely a heap of recurving wires that go nowhere and prove nothing.
But to dismiss Sartre's work as such would be akin to trying to read it upside-down. From that perspective, the words have no shape, let alone a greater meaning. The key to understanding words is to look at them from the right perspective, and this is especially true of Sartre. What is contained in Being and Nothingness is not fine, sound, indisputable ideas; it is rather a perspective, a way of looking at existence. It reveals marvelous vistas, and opens up entire hallways filled with doors to insight on the nature of being--but only if you look at it right. This book is not its words; it is the point-of-view that allowed the words to be written. The words themselves are as anamorphic as that modern trend in art exemplified by Bernard Pras, or Tim Noble and Sue Webster. They are heaps of seemingly unrelated things that spring to life if one stands in the right spot or shines the right light.
Which means that, just as in the works of Noble and Webster, there are three requisite elements for the installation of this art: the seething mass of wires, the point at which one must stand to see them properly, and the shadow that they create. Sartre's version of reality is just as concerned with what is not, with nothingness, as with what exists. He wants us to see the shadow that existence casts even more than he wants us to see existence itself. And that shadow is the truth revealed when the light of Sartre's vision is cast through existence onto the wall of our own experience.
Thursday, February 21, 2019
Ali-Imran II
I'm ready to level an accusation of false advertising against this book. The title promises new stories about the family of Mary, but so far only verses 35-50 have had anything to do with that. As much as I am enjoying exploring the theme of "submission", it is not what I was hoping for, and I'm ready to look for my stories in the Talmud instead.
103: The sin of sectarianism is the same as the sin of polytheism. Division into Jew and Christian and Muslim is no more a commision of this sin than division in Sunni and Shia. It is from the edge of this pit that true understanding of the Divine saves us.
104-105: A command that is easier said than done, as it requires direct rebellion against powerful human tendencies. Indeed, the formation and maintenance of such a community is itself the challenge, rather than the enforcement of "good" and "bad".
106-107: Indeed, the darkest of visages is that which has seen the Divine reality, and chosen the easier path in spite.
108-109: It is against the nature of the Divine reality to ackowledge either harm or division.
110: Its would be easy to observe that the same accusation levelled against Jews and Christians here could be applied to Muslims today.
111-112: The metaphor of a rope in the original بِحَبلٍ is killed by translation to "covenant" or "asylum" in some translations. Hulusi wisely leaves it literal, here and in v103.
113-115: Hulusi's metaphysical approach leaves the idea of "the last day", here and elsewhere, so far unaccounted for. The liberties he takes in translating it are rather without merit. The idea of a final reckoning is very clear and pronounced throught this book, and his refusal to acknolwedge it is glaring.
116-117: This metaphor is a bit arbritrary, and does not seem to illustrate what it is meant to illustrate. The frosty wind is not a result of people's own action, and its destruction of their crops does not seem to be a suitable symbol for a harm one brings upon oneself. And it belies the statement "Allah has not wronged them" which it is meant to reinforce.
118: Certainly incompatible with the frequent reminders that there is no East or West nor any other such thing as division in the Divine reality (most recently in v109).
119: But the above seeming contradiction can be understood in terms of not drawing to oneself the idea of division. For here it is observed that the natural inclination of the who understand the Divine to act ecumenically is not a reciprocal one.
120: A pessimistic and xenophobic view of humanity that Schopenhauer would have endorsed. Which does not make it wrong; only depressing. One interesting note is the use of مُحيطٌ to invoke knowledge of something. The way in which Allah knows something is different than the way in which we know it: reality is not something external to Him, and is known as one knows one's own body.
121: The battle referred to here is that on the slopes of Uhud (or so it is believed), and it is no doubt relevant to the verse that the prophet was injured here as a result of his soldiers' lack of fortitude.
122: It's curious that this battle is not framed as a loss, and that Allah is still called the وَلِيُّهُما of the guilty soldiers. One would almost be tempted to call this disingenuous.
123: The battle mentioned here was more clearly decided in the prophet's favor. Perhaps the intent is to contrast the result when one follows the divine path (as at Badr) with that when one gives in to temptation (as at Uhud). At any rate, Hulusi's rendering of تَشكُرونَ as "be of the evaluators" is opaque and inscrutable. I much prefer the translations "be grateful" or "give thanks" in other versions.
124-125: The addition of المَلائِكَةِ here is a fascinating one, and open to rather a lot of linguistic parsing. In what way are these angels marked? The meaning is left so unclear that, one might as well consider Hulusi's position that they are such in the sense that they have names, and are in fact aspects of the Divine name.
126-127: . . . which leads him to take the more extreme liberty of identifying them as parts of the individual essence, to the extent that it reflects the divine--a point decidedly not in the text.
128: Perhaps there were those who wondered why Allah did not destroy the enemy entirely. The simple explanation, that this was merely a military victory and not a miracle, is far too pedestrian for the prophet and his believers.
129: An uncommonly clear and relevant transition from the explanation above, and the warning below--
130: To Allah belong all your assets, as surely as do the lives of your enemies. To lust after wealth is to question Allah.
131-132: Standard issue religiosity.
133: Hulusi's approach to the identity of this رَبِّكُم is as fruitful as ever, perhaps the most fruitful line of thinking in his commentary so far. It's decidedly a modern concept to be concerned with forgiveness of oneself, from one's own divine nature, rather than frogiveness granted externally and arbitrarily from a divinity that we can only partially comprehend.
134: One of the best verses so far. The first of these three virtues has been emphasized throughout, but the addition of the latter two is natural, and enriches the understanding of exactly what "submission" looks like in praactice.
135-139: More verses that could just as easily have come from another religious text, and accordingly less interesting than those like 134 that seem unique to this book.
140: To the extent that Ecclesiastes 1:9 could be slipped in here without anyone noticing.
141-142: Sounds like the hunger games. I guess there's not room in heaven for everyone.
143: Be careful what you wish for?
144: This seems somewhat out of sync with the way the prophet is viewed among belivers today. Rather unexpected of him to be so self-effacing however.
145: A point that Islam gets better than most other religions, as far as I have experienced. Certainly the sentiment of keeping your eyes on spiritual things is present in the Bible, but I have yet to find a denomination of Christianity that practices it.
146-148: The backdrop of the battle at Uhud linders over this verse. No doubt the believers were in need of bolstering at that point.
149-150: Nothing remarkable here; nothing but vanilla religious invective.
151: This is, so far, the main offering of the Quran in my eyes: the emphasis on the unity of reality, and the proscription against thoughts of duality and separation. Naturally, Hulusi's liberties take it even farther from Tawhid to pantheism.
152-153: Seems like those responsible for the defeat at Uhud are getting off rather lightly here, considering the cost. Very politic of the prophet.
154: A concept plenty apparent in other religious texts as well, but lgoically unsustainable: the bad things that befall you, including your own weakness, are sent from above as a test. But what need has the divine for a test? Surely all things have unfolded as they will unfold in the eyes of reality.
155: More absolution for those who selfishly escaped with their lives.
156: This is rather a surprising doubling down on the above absolution, at once very politic and very zen. From one perspective, it's very sensible of the prophet to reassure his living followers that they will be remembered honorably. From another, it's not calculated at all, but consistent with previous admonitions to mind one's own business, and submit to the divine--even if that divinity has put fear in your heart.
157-158: But one wonders why quite so much ink is spent on it.
159: This admonition, which seems to be directed at the writer, not at the reader, removessome suspicion of calculation.
160: And the reader is merely left with a bit of foreboding. Those who Allah leaves have no hope. But were we not just told that those who ran from battle did so because Allah allowed fear to enter them? If this is the case, what is to prevent us from simply assuming that all our baser tendencies are His plan, and surrendering to them?
161-163: Difficult not to see some inconsistency here in the original text, and one can see why the Sufi approach is so attractive. If one wishes to take the book as divinely inspired and flawless, then the Sufi reading is the only one that effectively deals with these inconsistencies.
164: There is an evident pattern of inserting generic verses like this one into the middle of a discourse, one which in a western dialectic would be seen as unfocused and illogical. But once one surrenders to the pattern, it becomes clear that these are interjections, and the effect is rather one of giving the reader a break from didacticism.
165: After which interjections, the topic is returned to exactly where it was lain.
166-168: And this seems to be the moral: not that the dead were at the mercy of their natures, and chould be remembered honorably, but rather that their actions have nothing whatsoever to do with our own. To sum up, mind your own business.
169-174: Though it never hurts to end with a little panegyric.
175: The logical extenstion of this verse is that be careful, not who you worship, but who you fear. Be afraid, be very afraid.
176-177: More admonition to "mind your own business". I just wish it was more consistent with the overall theme of the book. Difficult to reconcile "don't worry about the unbelievers" with "KILL THEM ALL".
178: Presumably rhetorical here, and not literal theology.
179: In contrast to this verse, which is making a very clear statement of theology: you can't hope to know the divine mysteries, unless Allah chooses you as a prophet/apostle/messenger/rasul (depending on which translation you prefer). So just do as we say.
180: In light of the previous verse, it is tempting to take the stinginess mentioned here as refusal to share divine truth. Although I suspect tht we are about to see a more material application.
181-184: Well, I was wrong. This is pretty clearly a condemnation of the Jews' hoarding of spiritual resources, not material ones, though the two have some overlap here.
185: A lovely verse, partly in its clarity, but mostly in its universality: the dismissal of this life as "delusion" fits nicely into the sentiment of all religions, but also upon a deeper look into the the metaphysical branches of those religions: Sufi, Kabbalah, and the Dao.
186: A warning is added to the usual caution against dualism (a mistaken belief in separation). The sin of "those who were given the book before you" is also, in its own way, one of separation, however; it is vertical face of dualism: pride, superiority, and dominance.
187-189: As made clear here: their mistake is in trying vainly to keep the divine truth for themselves.
190: . . . when the idea of separation into us and them is completely alien to the divine reality. Such separation is no more possible than the ascription to the divine of duality.
191: It is a shame that the element of fear has to be introduced. Surely it's a practical matter, and one common to all religions. And it's just as common for the metaphysical sides of those religions to discard it.
192-195: It's an equally universal rhetorical tool to double down on the stick, and then proffer the carrot. Almost textbook abusive behavior. Surely there is a thesis to be written about the overlap between the behavior of abusers, and the behavior ascribed to the divine in world religions.
196-200: The explications added by Hulusi here are almost unnecesary. The truth is there in these verses for all to see: mind your business, especially the business of your Rabb. This applies without embellishment to material, religious, and metaphysical matters alike.
But I'm still bitter that we have had nothing of the advertised story of Imran since basically verse 59.
103: The sin of sectarianism is the same as the sin of polytheism. Division into Jew and Christian and Muslim is no more a commision of this sin than division in Sunni and Shia. It is from the edge of this pit that true understanding of the Divine saves us.
104-105: A command that is easier said than done, as it requires direct rebellion against powerful human tendencies. Indeed, the formation and maintenance of such a community is itself the challenge, rather than the enforcement of "good" and "bad".
106-107: Indeed, the darkest of visages is that which has seen the Divine reality, and chosen the easier path in spite.
108-109: It is against the nature of the Divine reality to ackowledge either harm or division.
110: Its would be easy to observe that the same accusation levelled against Jews and Christians here could be applied to Muslims today.
111-112: The metaphor of a rope in the original بِحَبلٍ is killed by translation to "covenant" or "asylum" in some translations. Hulusi wisely leaves it literal, here and in v103.
113-115: Hulusi's metaphysical approach leaves the idea of "the last day", here and elsewhere, so far unaccounted for. The liberties he takes in translating it are rather without merit. The idea of a final reckoning is very clear and pronounced throught this book, and his refusal to acknolwedge it is glaring.
116-117: This metaphor is a bit arbritrary, and does not seem to illustrate what it is meant to illustrate. The frosty wind is not a result of people's own action, and its destruction of their crops does not seem to be a suitable symbol for a harm one brings upon oneself. And it belies the statement "Allah has not wronged them" which it is meant to reinforce.
118: Certainly incompatible with the frequent reminders that there is no East or West nor any other such thing as division in the Divine reality (most recently in v109).
119: But the above seeming contradiction can be understood in terms of not drawing to oneself the idea of division. For here it is observed that the natural inclination of the who understand the Divine to act ecumenically is not a reciprocal one.
120: A pessimistic and xenophobic view of humanity that Schopenhauer would have endorsed. Which does not make it wrong; only depressing. One interesting note is the use of مُحيطٌ to invoke knowledge of something. The way in which Allah knows something is different than the way in which we know it: reality is not something external to Him, and is known as one knows one's own body.
121: The battle referred to here is that on the slopes of Uhud (or so it is believed), and it is no doubt relevant to the verse that the prophet was injured here as a result of his soldiers' lack of fortitude.
122: It's curious that this battle is not framed as a loss, and that Allah is still called the وَلِيُّهُما of the guilty soldiers. One would almost be tempted to call this disingenuous.
123: The battle mentioned here was more clearly decided in the prophet's favor. Perhaps the intent is to contrast the result when one follows the divine path (as at Badr) with that when one gives in to temptation (as at Uhud). At any rate, Hulusi's rendering of تَشكُرونَ as "be of the evaluators" is opaque and inscrutable. I much prefer the translations "be grateful" or "give thanks" in other versions.
124-125: The addition of المَلائِكَةِ here is a fascinating one, and open to rather a lot of linguistic parsing. In what way are these angels marked? The meaning is left so unclear that, one might as well consider Hulusi's position that they are such in the sense that they have names, and are in fact aspects of the Divine name.
126-127: . . . which leads him to take the more extreme liberty of identifying them as parts of the individual essence, to the extent that it reflects the divine--a point decidedly not in the text.
128: Perhaps there were those who wondered why Allah did not destroy the enemy entirely. The simple explanation, that this was merely a military victory and not a miracle, is far too pedestrian for the prophet and his believers.
129: An uncommonly clear and relevant transition from the explanation above, and the warning below--
130: To Allah belong all your assets, as surely as do the lives of your enemies. To lust after wealth is to question Allah.
131-132: Standard issue religiosity.
133: Hulusi's approach to the identity of this رَبِّكُم is as fruitful as ever, perhaps the most fruitful line of thinking in his commentary so far. It's decidedly a modern concept to be concerned with forgiveness of oneself, from one's own divine nature, rather than frogiveness granted externally and arbitrarily from a divinity that we can only partially comprehend.
134: One of the best verses so far. The first of these three virtues has been emphasized throughout, but the addition of the latter two is natural, and enriches the understanding of exactly what "submission" looks like in praactice.
135-139: More verses that could just as easily have come from another religious text, and accordingly less interesting than those like 134 that seem unique to this book.
140: To the extent that Ecclesiastes 1:9 could be slipped in here without anyone noticing.
141-142: Sounds like the hunger games. I guess there's not room in heaven for everyone.
143: Be careful what you wish for?
144: This seems somewhat out of sync with the way the prophet is viewed among belivers today. Rather unexpected of him to be so self-effacing however.
145: A point that Islam gets better than most other religions, as far as I have experienced. Certainly the sentiment of keeping your eyes on spiritual things is present in the Bible, but I have yet to find a denomination of Christianity that practices it.
146-148: The backdrop of the battle at Uhud linders over this verse. No doubt the believers were in need of bolstering at that point.
149-150: Nothing remarkable here; nothing but vanilla religious invective.
151: This is, so far, the main offering of the Quran in my eyes: the emphasis on the unity of reality, and the proscription against thoughts of duality and separation. Naturally, Hulusi's liberties take it even farther from Tawhid to pantheism.
152-153: Seems like those responsible for the defeat at Uhud are getting off rather lightly here, considering the cost. Very politic of the prophet.
154: A concept plenty apparent in other religious texts as well, but lgoically unsustainable: the bad things that befall you, including your own weakness, are sent from above as a test. But what need has the divine for a test? Surely all things have unfolded as they will unfold in the eyes of reality.
155: More absolution for those who selfishly escaped with their lives.
156: This is rather a surprising doubling down on the above absolution, at once very politic and very zen. From one perspective, it's very sensible of the prophet to reassure his living followers that they will be remembered honorably. From another, it's not calculated at all, but consistent with previous admonitions to mind one's own business, and submit to the divine--even if that divinity has put fear in your heart.
157-158: But one wonders why quite so much ink is spent on it.
159: This admonition, which seems to be directed at the writer, not at the reader, removessome suspicion of calculation.
160: And the reader is merely left with a bit of foreboding. Those who Allah leaves have no hope. But were we not just told that those who ran from battle did so because Allah allowed fear to enter them? If this is the case, what is to prevent us from simply assuming that all our baser tendencies are His plan, and surrendering to them?
161-163: Difficult not to see some inconsistency here in the original text, and one can see why the Sufi approach is so attractive. If one wishes to take the book as divinely inspired and flawless, then the Sufi reading is the only one that effectively deals with these inconsistencies.
164: There is an evident pattern of inserting generic verses like this one into the middle of a discourse, one which in a western dialectic would be seen as unfocused and illogical. But once one surrenders to the pattern, it becomes clear that these are interjections, and the effect is rather one of giving the reader a break from didacticism.
165: After which interjections, the topic is returned to exactly where it was lain.
166-168: And this seems to be the moral: not that the dead were at the mercy of their natures, and chould be remembered honorably, but rather that their actions have nothing whatsoever to do with our own. To sum up, mind your own business.
169-174: Though it never hurts to end with a little panegyric.
175: The logical extenstion of this verse is that be careful, not who you worship, but who you fear. Be afraid, be very afraid.
176-177: More admonition to "mind your own business". I just wish it was more consistent with the overall theme of the book. Difficult to reconcile "don't worry about the unbelievers" with "KILL THEM ALL".
178: Presumably rhetorical here, and not literal theology.
179: In contrast to this verse, which is making a very clear statement of theology: you can't hope to know the divine mysteries, unless Allah chooses you as a prophet/apostle/messenger/rasul (depending on which translation you prefer). So just do as we say.
180: In light of the previous verse, it is tempting to take the stinginess mentioned here as refusal to share divine truth. Although I suspect tht we are about to see a more material application.
181-184: Well, I was wrong. This is pretty clearly a condemnation of the Jews' hoarding of spiritual resources, not material ones, though the two have some overlap here.
185: A lovely verse, partly in its clarity, but mostly in its universality: the dismissal of this life as "delusion" fits nicely into the sentiment of all religions, but also upon a deeper look into the the metaphysical branches of those religions: Sufi, Kabbalah, and the Dao.
186: A warning is added to the usual caution against dualism (a mistaken belief in separation). The sin of "those who were given the book before you" is also, in its own way, one of separation, however; it is vertical face of dualism: pride, superiority, and dominance.
187-189: As made clear here: their mistake is in trying vainly to keep the divine truth for themselves.
190: . . . when the idea of separation into us and them is completely alien to the divine reality. Such separation is no more possible than the ascription to the divine of duality.
191: It is a shame that the element of fear has to be introduced. Surely it's a practical matter, and one common to all religions. And it's just as common for the metaphysical sides of those religions to discard it.
192-195: It's an equally universal rhetorical tool to double down on the stick, and then proffer the carrot. Almost textbook abusive behavior. Surely there is a thesis to be written about the overlap between the behavior of abusers, and the behavior ascribed to the divine in world religions.
196-200: The explications added by Hulusi here are almost unnecesary. The truth is there in these verses for all to see: mind your business, especially the business of your Rabb. This applies without embellishment to material, religious, and metaphysical matters alike.
But I'm still bitter that we have had nothing of the advertised story of Imran since basically verse 59.
Wednesday, February 20, 2019
William Shakespeare: Sonnets
Well, that was unexpected. Naturally I had read many of these before, taught some to my students, and even committed a few to memory. I certainly thought that I "knew" them; I was wrong.
Reading the sonnets out of sequence and context deprived me of the story behind them, and there is no mistake that there is a narrative here. There is no "stopping place", no division where one idea stops and the next begins, though there may be said to be a "pausing place" at the end of n.126. And the narrative's content is as startling to this supposedly well-read English teacher as is the existence. In my Shakespeare classes, textbooks, and teaching materials, there was occassionally a winking nod to Shakespeare's relationship with the "fair youth" of the first 126 sonnets that centers on the clever wordplay and metrical games of n.20. "Teehee," the body of scholarship seems to say, "Wouldn't it be a gas if Shakespeare were just the teensiest bit gay?" Hahahano. Read consecutively, these sonnets are the gayest poem I have ever read. The sonnets are not "occassionally homoerotic in nature," they are a queer pride parade on paper.
"But, but, the dark lady!" one might protest. "Surely she is evidence that Shakespeare liked the ladies . . ." Sure. His body did at least like the ladies. But the tone of the last section is so starkly different, so comparatively rational and physical, that it is impossible to say that the writer felt the same way about her as he did about the fair youth. The former (in the preceding sentence, not in sequence) are poems of lust. But the desperate, pleading, spiritual emotion of the first 126 is Love. I would go so far to say that any attraction the dark lady had for the writer is rooted in his feelings for the fair youth, and could not possibly have arisen on its own. And if I were to go farther, and abandon adherence to what is provable in the text, I would go so far to say that the physicality of the last poems are a proxy for the physicality that he was unable to express to their true object. Perhaps in the same way that my feelings about these poems are a proxy for the feelings I could not possibly allow myself to express in life.
Reading the sonnets out of sequence and context deprived me of the story behind them, and there is no mistake that there is a narrative here. There is no "stopping place", no division where one idea stops and the next begins, though there may be said to be a "pausing place" at the end of n.126. And the narrative's content is as startling to this supposedly well-read English teacher as is the existence. In my Shakespeare classes, textbooks, and teaching materials, there was occassionally a winking nod to Shakespeare's relationship with the "fair youth" of the first 126 sonnets that centers on the clever wordplay and metrical games of n.20. "Teehee," the body of scholarship seems to say, "Wouldn't it be a gas if Shakespeare were just the teensiest bit gay?" Hahahano. Read consecutively, these sonnets are the gayest poem I have ever read. The sonnets are not "occassionally homoerotic in nature," they are a queer pride parade on paper.
"But, but, the dark lady!" one might protest. "Surely she is evidence that Shakespeare liked the ladies . . ." Sure. His body did at least like the ladies. But the tone of the last section is so starkly different, so comparatively rational and physical, that it is impossible to say that the writer felt the same way about her as he did about the fair youth. The former (in the preceding sentence, not in sequence) are poems of lust. But the desperate, pleading, spiritual emotion of the first 126 is Love. I would go so far to say that any attraction the dark lady had for the writer is rooted in his feelings for the fair youth, and could not possibly have arisen on its own. And if I were to go farther, and abandon adherence to what is provable in the text, I would go so far to say that the physicality of the last poems are a proxy for the physicality that he was unable to express to their true object. Perhaps in the same way that my feelings about these poems are a proxy for the feelings I could not possibly allow myself to express in life.
Tuesday, February 12, 2019
신경숙: 엄마를 부탁해
이 책을 일거내고 "우리 어머니의 이야기가 아니"라는 생각이 들었다. 표면적으로 그렇다. 우리 어머니는 전쟁 때문에 겪으신 고통이 없고 사랑이 없는 결혼 아니시고 특히 길을 잃어버려서 돌아가시지 않았다. 그렇게 보면, "우리 어머니의 이야기는 아니고 우리 할머니의 이야기라"는 생각이 된다.
그러나 다른 구채적인 점을 보니 "우리 어머니의 이야기 맞다"고 할 수 있다. 통증을 겪으셔도 집안일을 부지런히 해내던 점. 죽은 아이 하나를 낳으신 점. 동생의 자살을 겪으신 점. 깊이 보면 볼 수록 우리 양쪽 할머니의 이야기 맞으며 우리 어머니, 이모, 삼촌댁, 새상의 모든 엄마의 이야기 맞다는 깨달음이 된다. 상모 마리아까지.
오늘도 그런가? 내 주변여성 친구들, 우리 여동생, 계수도, 이러한 삶을 살 수밖에 없는 것인가? 예방할 방법이 업슬까? 와 같은 질문이 쌓여있다. 답은 모르겠지만, 신경숙의 작품명과 동일하는 엄마의 마지막으로 겪은 자식으로부텨 잊힌 슬픔을 우리 현실 어머니는 겪으시지 않게 할 수 있다.
그러나 다른 구채적인 점을 보니 "우리 어머니의 이야기 맞다"고 할 수 있다. 통증을 겪으셔도 집안일을 부지런히 해내던 점. 죽은 아이 하나를 낳으신 점. 동생의 자살을 겪으신 점. 깊이 보면 볼 수록 우리 양쪽 할머니의 이야기 맞으며 우리 어머니, 이모, 삼촌댁, 새상의 모든 엄마의 이야기 맞다는 깨달음이 된다. 상모 마리아까지.
오늘도 그런가? 내 주변여성 친구들, 우리 여동생, 계수도, 이러한 삶을 살 수밖에 없는 것인가? 예방할 방법이 업슬까? 와 같은 질문이 쌓여있다. 답은 모르겠지만, 신경숙의 작품명과 동일하는 엄마의 마지막으로 겪은 자식으로부텨 잊힌 슬픔을 우리 현실 어머니는 겪으시지 않게 할 수 있다.
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