Erasmus: The Praise of Folly

The problem with the blissfullnes of ignorance is that cognizance is a one-way street. Once aware, one cannot squeeze back through the keyhole to the gleeful land of Ignorasia, where there are no taxes and the streets are made of Turkish Delight.

Do not despair, though. Once one has become disignorant, there is still the option of being foolish. That is to say, one can still behave as if not knowing any better. Erasmus raises the question, "Is foolishness as blissful as ignorance?", and answers, "Yes."

Whether he means, in earnest, to suppose that the life of a fool is rewarding is open to debate. At times, his reasoning is so flimsy one has to assume he argues in jest. Most of this may be attributable to the conflation of natural fools, the ignorant, with those who act foolishly. This is no mean distinction; what is bliss for one is often secret death for the other. While the natural fool behaves foolishly, he does so through little fault of his own, and tends not to berate himself, perhaps not even recognizing the folly of his actions. The foolish man, as opposed to the fool, acts foolishly through conceit, laziness, fear, or hedonism. As such, his spirit withers on the vine every time the virtuous choice is before him and he ignores it.

Erasmus isolates the true issue when he asks, "Isn't it true that the happiest creatures are those which are least artificial and most natural?" (72). When he stipulates that fools are to be envied, he does not mean the stupid, but the simple. While it not possible for a cognizant person to behave foolishly without injuring his spirit, for the same man to live simply is not only healthy, but preferable. This solves a difficult dilemma which faces those gifted with intelligence. Often, a little bit of wisdom (which is all any human can be had to say) is more dangerous than none at all. Awareness without understanding of the primal functioning of the universe could, if dwelt upon, drive a man into a cyclone of turbulent and circular thought. All such analysis does is confuse and frustrate the would-be sage, for he always reasons himself back to his starting point. "Those who have a foretaste of [wisdom]--and it comes to very few--experience something very like madness" (131). And what good would it be to understand completely, even if such a thing were possible? None whatsoever. Therefore let the truly wise man discard all wisdom, especially that labelled 'learning,' and pursue simplicity--not foolishness--as the highest of virtues.